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formally for adoption, declared abandoned, criminally neglected,
or its physical or moral welfare seriously endangered by its par-
ents' vicious or immoral habits or associations,3 2 yet in State ex
rel. Deason v. McWilliams,33 though none of these causes seem
to have been made out under the facts, the court affirmed a
judgment denying the parents the right to recover the custody of
their child from persons to whom they had once entrusted it with
the view to permitting its adoption. It is true that the parents'
decision to recover their child probably was motivated by family
indignation over their action, but the writer must agree with
Justice Ponder's dissent that this is insufficient reason under
the law to deny them that custody.
Other decisions on the subject of custody were of more
routine character. 34
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
SERVITUDES
In the combined cases of Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.
and Young v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,' the court achieved a re-
sult which might well seem to be the right and equitable one in
the administration of justice, but an analysis of its opinion leaves
one in unavoidable confusion. The two plaintiffs, Fontenot and
Young, owned adjacent properties; the defendants were petro-
leum and engineering companies prospecting for oil. The plain-
tiff Young gave oral permission to the defendants to enter upon
his land and there conduct geophysical operations; the plaintiff
Fontenot had refused entry on his property. As a result of de-
fendants' sub-surface blasting explosions, certain damages were
caused in the homes of the two plaintiffs. The court rendered
judgment in favor of both plaintiffs covering actual damage in-
32. LA. R.S. 9:401 et seq. 9:551 (1950).
33. 227 La. 957, 81 So.2d 8 (1955).
34. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 228 La. 77, 81 So.2d 775 (1955), denying the availability
of a suspensive appeal in custody cases; and Decker v. Landry, 227 La. 603, 80
So.2d 91 (1955) and Sharp v. Sharp, 228 La. 126, 81 So.2d 833 (1955), dealing
with issues of fact rather than law in the award of custody after separation and
divorce.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 227 La. 866, 80 So.2d 845 (1955).
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curred plus an additional amount for invasion of privacy, incon-
venience, and mental anguish.
The court stated "that clearly the plaintiffs in this instance
do not bring an action in tort but one that springs from an obli-
gation imposed upon property owners by the operation of law ' 2
and cited as authority Civil Code article 6673 and the case of
Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R. 4 Article 667 appears in the Civil
Code in the chapter "Of Servitudes Imposed by Law" and comes
after the general principles of predial servitudes, which repeat-
edly insist upon the predial servitude being a charge on one estate
for the benefit of another estate.5 Only one significant departure
has been made, and that was in connection with the so-called
"mineral servitude," which is not so much an exception to the
primary requirement that there be two separate properties and
two distinct owners as it is the development of a branch of law
that is practically sui juris.
In the Fontenot case, the defendants were not owners of any
of the property concerned, and it is not seen how this action for
damages comes under the "sic utere" servitude of article 667. It
may well have been the socially desirable result - in determining
where to place the burden of loss resulting from such blasting op-
erations - to hold defendants responsible without reference to
any question of negligence; however, it is submitted that the use
of Civil Code article 667 was not the proper instrument in this
case.
If any application were to be found for article 667, it might
have been considered as grounds for suit by Mr. Fontenot against
his neighbor Mr. Young, because Mr. Young's property had been
used, with his permission, in such a way that damage was caused
to Mr. Fontenot's property.
A few years ago, the present writer observed with apprecia-
tion6 the first recent application of article 667 in the case of
Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 7 but in that case the defendant was
2. Id. at 879, 80 So.2d at 849. For a discussion of the torts aspect of the two
cases, see page 267 infra.
3. "Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he
can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of
enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him."
4. 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 646-654 (1870).
6. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term - Prop-
crty, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 236 (1948).
7. 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947).
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a property owner and was held responsible in that capacity for
the way in which it utilized its property. The remarks the writer
made at that time were not directed toward the indiscriminate
use of the "sic utere" servitude for situations to which it did not
apply. If the defendant was conducting activities but not in the
capacity of a property owner, and if it is felt that there should
be liability for damages without reference to negligence or fault,
the "predial or landed" servitude of article 667 is not the appro-
priate legal basis for the decision.
PUBLIC ROADS
In Wharton v. City of AlexandriaP the plaintiff opposed the
paving of a street on the ground that it had never been dedicated.
It was conceded that no formal dedication had taken place. How-
ever, the road had been in public use for twenty-five years, and
there was evidence that it had been worked and maintained by
the police jury of the parish for a period in excess of three years.
Accordingly, under R.S. 48:491, the street was held to be public
and subject to paving, and so forth. This part of the statute may
generally be considered as applying to rural parish roads-as dis-
tinguished from city streets, but the language of the statute is
very broad and applies to the maintenance or working of roads
or streets by either the parish or the municipal authorities.
To reinforce its decision, the court pointed out that the plain-
tiffs and their authors had acknowledged that there was a road
in front of their property. This appeared in two conveyances as
part of the boundary descriptions of the property, and in the
signing of a petition to change the name of the street. The in-
sertion of this issue leaves two other questions: (1) how far
would a court go in holding a street or road to be public merely
on the basis of such acknowledgments, and (2) is the acknowl-
edgment that one's property fronts on a road tantamount to an
assertion that it is a "public road"? Why could it not be a "pri-
vate" road?
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 646 (1870).
9. 226 La. 675, 77 So.2d 1 (1955). For a discussion of this case from the
aspect of local government, see page 315 infra.
